Introduction
This third and last paper in the series is intended to show the practising doctor how these statistical concepts could be applied to his own clinical decision making. Unfortunately there is not sufficient experience to give advice applicable to every case. Ways in which the problem can be tackled can, however, be suggested and useful empirical techniques described.
Why has the application of these techniques to everyday clinical practice been so slow ? Though Bayes's theorem is some 200 years old, decision theory, on which much of the thinking of these papers is based, is very recent and dates only from the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern.' Further, the existence of a formal theory may produce an unjustified conflict with the art of medicine in the mind of the clinician and may be considered as a reflection on his professional skill. Considerations of cost have encountered even greater resistance in the past-but not now. There can be few who have not been forced to accept that the finances of the NHS are limited, and there must be more rational use of the available resources. The use of a test can be excluded on its error rates alone. It has been recognised for many years2 that if the false-positive rate of a test is sufficiently high it may, when applied to a population where the incidence rate-that is, the initial probability of a disease-is sufficiently low, be more often false than true. The test in such an application is valueless and its use a waste of time and money.
Efficiency of tests
An application of test reduction is to the problem of the differential diagnosis of some limited group of disorders-for example, the acute abdomen or dyspepsia-or the problem of deciding which patient with chest pain needs admission or which patient with jaundice needs a laparotomy. Other examples may be concerned with prognosis-for example, forecasting which of several different outcomes may follow severe head injury-or the recognition of which patient with chronic air flow obstruction may be expected to respond to corticosteroids. All these problems are medically different but they are similar mathematically, and consist in assigning a patient to a certain class, either diagnostic, prognostic, or therapeutic, on the basis of evidence supplied from a series of tests.
In all these problems large numbers of tests may be used. This is particularly so when the study has previously suffered from dyspepsia, who gave a recent history of abdominal discomfort or pain, which was not episodic and which was getting worse. We recognise that such a pattern is highly suggestive of carcinoma of the stomach, though individually each of the indicants might occur in a patient with a chronic duodenal ulcer.
If we have many test results (indicants) the number of possible combinations can be very great. If there are 50 possible indicants, the number of possible combinations or patterns taken four at a time is nearly a quarter of a million. If we want to look at combinations of five at a time, there are over two million. These numbers are unmanageable. Naively we might suppose that if we found the single most useful test for our discriminative procedure, retained this, and sought for the next most powerful test to be added to it and continued in this way, we could accumulate the most powerful combination of any size for our purpose. Unfortunately this method does not work when dependency is present. Teather, who investigated the statistical techniques useful in distinguishing "medical" from "surgical" jaundice,' identified the single most powerful discriminative test, the most powerful pair, and then the most powerful triad (personal communication). The most powerful triad did not contain the single most powerful test or either of the tests used in the most powerful pair. This paradoxical result rests on dependency. Teather in the same paper3 showed in a theoretical study that two indicants, each of which alone gave no discrimination whatever, can be combined to give perfect discrimination between two classes. The position may be summarised by saying that, while we have at present no mathematically perfect method for selecting tests, current statistical methods can give valuable guidance.
Test reduction need not be complete since the retention of some redundancy helps to compensate for the error that is inherent in all tests. A familiar example of this mechanism occurs with the English language, which has been calculated to be 5000 redundant.4 If English were rewritten to exclude redundancy, there would be a great saving of time in reading or listening to it but if one word were missed the sentence containing it would become meaningless. Redundancy can be thought of as a simple error-correcting mechanism.
Cost-effectiveness of tests
The third main problem is measuring the value of a single test when the test has a significant cost. This may be monetary in terms of equipment and staff or cost to the patient in terms of discomfort and danger. Both these sorts of costs must be set against the expected improvement in the patient's health. We may call this the problem of cost effectiveness. Sometimes a simple test would lead to completely unjustifiable costs. The American Cancer Society advised that, to detect cancer of the bowel, six tests should be made for occult blood in the stool and that a positive result should be followed by a barium enema examination. Neuhauser and Levicke5 analysed this advice and by making certain plausible assumptions of the costs of tests and of barium examinations, showed that, if it were followed, detecting a case of cancer of the colon after the sixth occult blood test would cost $47 000 000. While such advice stands self-condemned, the analysis of cost effectiveness usually requires the concept of utilities discussed in the first paper and the technique of decision theory.' The following example illustrates the method of analysis.
We suppose that a man aged 55 has had a historypf indigestion for some months and a gastric ulcer is seen on radiological examination. If we have no access to endoscopic examination we have to decide, on the basis of the radiological examination alone, on either medical treatment, assuming that the ulcer is benign, or surgical resection, assuming that the ulcer is malignant. The components of the decision problem can be set out in a table.
At the top of each column are what we may call the events, 657 the designations being shortened here to "benign" and "malignant," and the rows follow from the decisions, "medical treatment" and "surgical treatment," on the left. By "medical treatment" we mean a course of cimetidine and a further x-ray examination in six weeks. In the body of the assume that the probability of the ulcer's being malignant was 0 04-that is, a 4% chance-and therefore that the probability of its being benign was 096-that is, a 96% chance. We can now estimate the expected value of a treatment-that is, its value on the average. The expected value of medical treatment will be (0-96 x 1 00)+(0 04 x0-281)= 0971, while the expected value of surgical treatment will be (0 96 x 0 970) +(0 04 x 0.331) =0 944. For the moment, ignoring the costs of treatment and with no other information, we can only choose the treatment with the greatest expected utility, in this case medical treatment. Informally, we may say that this is the best bet. This is the course of action that we pursue on the evidence so far available but we can now ask the question: would gastroscopy be worthwhile? Gastroscopy in the hands of an experienced endoscopist with biopsy examination is a highly accurate procedure and we may assume, for simplicity, that endoscopy gives perfect information. By perfect information we mean that it will tell us with certainty whether the ulcer is benign or malignant, so that the expected utility of treatment with perfect information is obtained by multiplying the maximal utility in each column by the appropriate probability and summing the answers-that is, (0 96 x 100) +(0 04 x 0-331)= 0 973. The difference between this and the greatest expected utility derived from deciding on the best treatment as discussed above, 0 973-0-971=0 002, may be called the expected value of perfect information. This gain in utility has now to be set against the cost of the procedure to decide whether the additional cost is "worthwhile." A possible method of comparison is to say: Let C1 be the total cost of treating the patient without endoscopy and let C, be the cost of an endoscopy, then endoscopy should be performed if Expected utility with endoscopy expected utility without endoscopy Cl+C2 C1
In the practical problem of estimating costs of medical and surgical procedures we have found the cost accountants of the area health board most helpful. Using the costs they estimated, and given all the assumptions, we found that gastroscopy could not be justified. But we have also to consider the further situation in which the ulcer fails to heal after six weeks' medical treatment. The probability that it is now malignant will rise steeply to perhaps 0 5, and we must then recalculate the decision after adjusting the matrix of utilities and including the change in probabilities. Calculation now shows that, given the assumptions, gastroscopy is justified in preference to surgical treatment, which is otherwise the treatment of choice. We have made all calculations on the assumption that gastroscopy is error free. This is untrue but the error is slight, can be measured, and can easily be included in the calculations. 6 This model of the decision problem is an accepted one and the development of a satisfactory model is usually half the battle. The other half is the estimation of values for the variables, in particular the estimation of the utilities for states of health. We can only touch on this difficult problem.
Utilities have an "as if" existence. If doctors act consistently then their actions can be thought of as if there were a value or utility attached to a state of health coupled with a probability of attaining it. We can elicit this implicit utility only by testing a doctor in either a real or a simulated situation and finding out with what probabilities of success or failure he would advise a particular course of action such as a surgical operation. From his replies to a group of problems, we can estimate his utility function-that is, the values or utilities he attaches to a set of states of health. The method is promising but is in its infancy. [7] [8] [9] [10] We give this example of an "ulcer-cancer" to show that we can now envisage the possibility of measuring the cost effectiveness of a test with some degree of objectivity. Introduction A migraine attack may start suddenly with an aura or develop slowly with a mounting headache. There is a phase, however, even before the headache or aura that is recognised by most clinicians as well as some patients. Thus George Eliot felt National Hospitals for Nervous DiseaspLondon WC1, and City of London Migraine Clinic, London EC1 J N BLAU, MD, FRcP, consultant physician "dangerously well before an attack"' but Sir John Forbes had an "irresistible and horrid drowsiness"2; Lady Conway ate her supper with "a greedy appetite" and her "pain would almost certainly follow the next morning,"3 whereas Du Bois Reymond's migraines were "in general preceded by constipation."2
In a recent review Friedman4 wrote, "Some investigators believe that these changes (prodromal symptoms) are not related to the migraine syndrome ... [my] "experience, however, indicates that these symptoms are part of the migraine attack and are therefore truly prodromal." Surprisingly, this facet of the clinical picture of migraine has received little attention. Hence I undertook this prospective study of 50 patients with migraine uncomplicated by other conditions.
Patients
All patients were seen by me in outpatient clinics in neurological or general hospitals or in a migraine clinic, having been referred by a doctor. The history was taken to establish the diagnosis of migraine, as defined,5 and whether it was the common or classical variety. Patients were then asked if they had any indication beforehand that an attack might follow. Some gave spontaneous descriptions of preheadache symptoms. Others had to be asked directly if they noticed variations
